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PROTECTION FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES WITH STATE
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The Alaska Supreme Court chartered new territory in the controversy over the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in Alaska
Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska. By striking down
provisions that limit state and municipal employee benefits to the
spouses of employees, the court extended the state constitution’s
equal protection clause to include non-discrimination of same-sex
couples under the shadow of a state marriage amendment that constitutionally defines marriage as an institution exclusively limited to
one man and one woman. This Comment examines the decision of
the Alaska Supreme Court and, despite reservations for elements of
the court’s rationale, suggests that the decision may serve as a model
for at least temporary reconciliation between state marriage amendments and the need for equal protection for same-sex couples in
other states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last decade, the legal status of gays and lesbians has
moved in conflicting, if not seemingly chaotic fashion in the United
States. In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered the
State to make provisions for same-sex marriage, thereby granting
1
same-sex couples complete equality with opposite-sex couples. In
contrast, eighteen states have amended their constitutions since the
mid-1990s, including thirteen states in 2004, to explicitly limit mar2
riage between one man and one woman. The opposite directions
in which states have moved in respect to the legal recognition of
same-sex couples may reflect the perceived deep social divisiveness
that exists in contemporary American culture concerning gay and
3
lesbian rights. Indeed, the differing state approaches can be
framed as a prime example of states serving as laboratories in new
4
social experiments and, in this case, social experiments in the
forms of families and human relationships.
While such state-by-state experiments offer a competitive
means of finding effective solutions to complex legal and political
problems, widely varying approaches on questions concerning fundamental rights or the essential dignity of individuals may leave
some people in the nation far worse off than others in significant
ways. Fortunately, judicial review exists to identify fundamental

1. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
2. States that have amended their constitutions to define marriage as between one man and one woman are: Nebraska (2000), Nevada (2002), and Oregon
(2004). States that have amended their constitutions to define marriage as between one man and one woman and have passed statutes to define marriage for
the same purpose are: Alaska (1998/1996), Arkansas (2004/1997), Georgia
(2004/1996), Kansas (2005/1996), Kentucky (2004/1998), Louisiana (2004/1999),
Michigan (2004/1996), Mississippi (2004/1997), Missouri (2004/2001), Montana
(2004/1997), North Dakota (2004/1997), Ohio (2004/2004), Oklahoma (2004/1996),
Texas (2005/2003), and Utah (2004/1995). See Human Rights Campaign, “Statewide
Marriage
Laws,”
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=
Your_Community& ContentID=19449 (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
3. Evan Gerstmann, SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 201–06
(2004) (describing how the general public is unpredictable in how it will view
same-sex relationships in the future). The public’s perception of same-sex relationships is still divided, and that social acceptance of same-sex marriage may be
significantly less than legal acceptance of such unions. Id.
4. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (extolling
one of the advantages of federalism: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country”) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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rights and protect such rights from majoritarian whims.5 Decisions
by couples on how to manage their family, marriage, and living arrangements, in particular, are some of the most personal and fundamental issues guaranteed by the Constitution, and thus cannot
be limited by states unless absolutely necessary means are used to
6
achieve compelling interests. Private, consensual same-sex intimacy recently reached similar heights of constitutional protection
7
in Lawrence v. Texas.
A disconnect, consequently, has developed between a federal
constitutional recognition of sexuality-related privacy and the surge
in state constitutional amendments that explicitly refuse to recognize the sanctity and legal claims of same-sex couples. On October
28, 2005, however, the Alaska Supreme Court became the first
court to bridge the growing gap between legal protection and non8
protection of same-sex couples. Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex
rel. Carter v. Alaska is noteworthy because Alaska has statutory
and constitutional provisions that define marriage as an institution
9
limited to one man and one woman; yet, the supreme court held
that, according to the state constitution, the domestic same-sex
partners of state and municipal employees were entitled to the
same employee benefits offered to spouses of state and municipal
10
employees. Specifically, the court held “spousal limitations to be
unconstitutional as applied to public employees with same-sex do11
mestic partners.” In making such a ruling, the court was able to
extend legal recognition, or at least equal legal protection, to samesex couples in a limited but significant way, and yet remain faithful
to a jurisprudence that constitutionally denies marriage status to
same-sex couples. Because of its breakthrough analysis, rationale,
and conclusion, Carter may very well serve as a guide for the pur-

5. “Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in
the constitution by the declaration of rights.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison).
6. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781
(Alaska 2005).
9. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.05.011, .013
(2004).
10. Carter, 122 P.3d at 794.
11. Id. at 783–84.
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suit of rights of same-sex couples in the other seventeen states that
constitutionally limit marriage to one man and one woman.
II. HISTORY OF SAME-SEX LITIGATION AND LAW IN ALASKA
The possibility of extending equal benefits to domestic partners of same-sex public employees was first raised in 1995 by a superior court when policies that limited benefits to spouses of em12
Relying in part on Alaska’s then
ployees were challenged.
gender-neutral marriage statute that used the word “person” rather
13
than “man” and “woman,” the superior court held that the University of Alaska-Fairbanks could not legally limit spousal benefits
14
to husbands and wives. During the same time, same-sex plaintiffs
Jay Brause and Gene Dugan brought suit against the Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics in order to have their application for a marriage license approved, relying on the then gender-neutral marriage
15
statute.
In sharp reaction to the litigation, the state legislature drafted
a new marriage statute, which still stands today. The statute in part
reads:
Marriage is a civil contract entered into by one man
and one
16
woman that requires both a license and solemnization.
A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either under
common law or under statute, that is recognized by another state
or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights
granted by virtue of the marriage, including its termination, are
17
unenforceable in this state.
A same-sex relationship may not be recognized by the state as
18
being entitled to the benefits of marriage.

12. Tumeo v. Univ. of Alaska, No. 4 FA-94-43, 1995 WL 238359, at *1 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1995).
13. The wording of the marriage statute was revised in 1974 from “man” and
“woman” to “person” and the age of consent was changed to nineteen for both
men and women, 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws 17, most likely to comply with a 1972
amendment to Alaska’s constitution that prohibits sex discrimination, ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 3.
14. Tumeo, 1995 WL 238359, at *7.
15. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
16. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, § 1(a), 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 (codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (2004)).
17. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, § 2(a), 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 2 (codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(a) (2004)).
18. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, § 2(b), 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 2 (codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(b) (2004)).
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With the new marriage statute, Brause and Dugan amended
their complaint to ask for a declaration that the marriage statute
19
was unconstitutional. The superior court found that under the
20
equal protection amendment of Alaska’s constitution, choosing
one’s life partner, regardless of whether the partnership is tradi21
tional or nontraditional, is a fundamental right. Moreover, the
court determined that the prohibition on same-sex marriage was a
22
classification based on gender. The superior court then ordered a
trial requiring the State to show a compelling state interest in pro23
hibiting same-sex marriage.
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics ignited a movement for
amending the state constitution to explicitly define marriage as
only between one man and one woman. The supreme court de24
clined the State’s petition for review, which spurred the legislature
to pass the marriage amendment less than three months after
25
Brause.
As soon as the marriage amendment passed through the legislature, litigation commenced to prevent the measure from being

19. See Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 213, 218 n.30 (1999).
20. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (“This constitution is dedicated to the principles
that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and
the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal and
entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and that all
persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the State.”).
21. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (“However, just as the ‘decision to marry
and raise a child in a traditional family setting’ is constitutionally protected as a
fundamental right, so too should the decision to choose one’s life partner and have
a recognized nontraditional family be constitutionally protected. It is the decision
itself that is fundamental, whether the decision results in a traditional choice or
the nontraditional choice Brause and Dugan seek to have recognized. The same
constitution protects both.”).
22. Id. at *5 (“That this is sex-based classification can readily be demonstrated: if twins, one male and one female, both wished to marry a woman and
otherwise met all of the Code’s requirements, only gender prevents the twin sister
from marrying under the present law. Sex-based classification can hardly be more
obvious.”).
23. Id. at *6.
24. See Clarkson, supra note 19, at 224 n.75.
25. Brause was decided on February 27, 1998. 1998 WL 88743. The marriage
amendment passed through a final vote in the House on May 11, 1998, see H.
Journal 3785, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998), preceded by passage in the Senate
on April 16, 1998, see S. Journal 3300, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998).
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placed on the ballot of a state-wide referendum.26 Aware of the
time table for the referendum, the supreme court granted expedited consideration to the challenge against the marriage amend27
ment, as well as challenges to two other referendum measures.
The supreme court decided to permit the measure on the referen28
dum, provided that the second sentence of the marriage amend29
ment would be deleted. Finally, on November 3, 1998, voters
were presented with the proposed amendment: “To be valid or
recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one
30
man and one woman.”
Voters approved the marriage amendment by a rather large
31
margin of 68% to 32%. By approving the marriage amendment,
Alaska became the first state to adopt a marriage amendment that
32
explicitly limits marriage to just one man and one woman.
After approval of the amendment, the Legislature moved for
33
the Brause case to be dismissed as moot. The arguments by the
plaintiffs in Brause evolved to challenge the prohibition against
same-sex couples from receiving the same legal benefits and pro34
tections of married couples. The superior court dismissed the case
35
for lack of standing. The supreme court subsequently reviewed
36
the case and affirmed the lower court’s procedural decision, but
not without also providing some interesting analysis that questioned the merits of the State’s substantive arguments.

26. See Clarkson, supra note 19, at 236 n.141.
27. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1999).
28. The plaintiffs alleged that the Marriage Amendment amounted to a revision rather than an amendment, and thus required approval by Convention. Id. at
981. For the court’s discussion, see id. at 982.
29. Id. at 988. The court required the second sentence (“No provision of this
constitution may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit marriage between individuals of the same sex.”) to be deleted because the court was
concerned that it was verbal surplusage and that it could unintentionally “seriously interfere with important rights” in the future. Id.
30. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
31. Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244.
32. Although it is commonly believed that Hawaii also adopted a constitutional amendment prohibiting marriage for same-sex couples, this is not so—the
constitutional amendment that was approved on November 3, 1998, in Hawaii
reads, “The Legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples.” HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
33. Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244 n.203.
34. See Brause v. Alaska, 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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One of the plaintiffs’ claims was that Alaska Statute section
25.05.013(b), a provision of the new marriage statute, denied them,
as a same-sex couple, “at least 115 separate rights which are afforded to people who are able to marry,” such as “‘the denial of
health coverage, forms of insurance, equal protection in pension
and retirement plans, as well as testamentary and property
37
rights.’” According to the majority opinion, the State defended
Alaska Statute section 25.05.013(b) as being “purely symbolic,”
38
“lacking in ‘independent legal significance.’” Additionally, the
State argued that individual statutes based on marital status, not
Alaska Statute section 25.05.013(b), actually provide marital benefits, suggesting that each of those statutes are what ought to be
challenged under a sliding scale test rather than the merely sym39
bolic section 25.05.013(b) provision.
Although the court may have reasonably denied the plaintiffs
standing due to a lack of demonstrated harm, the court analyzed
the State’s arguments on the merits. This analysis revealed remarkably shaky ground for the State. Assuming Alaska Statute
section 25.05.013(b) is purely symbolic, symbolism seems to be a
rather weak justification for denying same-sex couples the purported 115 separate rights which are afforded to people who are
able to marry.
Furthermore, in Bess v. Ulmer, the court had struck verbal sur40
plusage from the marriage amendment by eliminating a sentence.
The court stated, “Of special concern is the possibility that the sentence in question might be construed at some future time in an unintended fashion which could seriously interfere with important
41
rights.” The plaintiffs in Brause challenged Alaska Statute section
25.05.013(b) precisely because of the statute’s interference with a
number of rights. The State’s questionable defense of Alaska Statute section 25.05.013(b) on the grounds of symbolism, and the retreat behind individual statutes that materialize rights and benefits
based upon marital status appears to have been a significant concession by the State that its marriage statutes, in spite of the marriage amendment, are not entirely justified in the face of the rights
demanded by same-sex couples.
The dissenting opinion in Brause followed the plaintiffs’ arguments further by suggesting that section 25.05.013(b) may be unconstitutional because it permits disparate treatment between
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
985 P.2d 979, 988 (Alaska 1999).
Id.
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same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, not just between married and unmarried couples.
Specifically, under section
25.05.013(b), same-sex couples would never receive benefits that
42
are given to unmarried opposite-sex couples. The dissent examined what unmarried opposite-sex domestic partners may be enti43
Section
tled to under the workman’s compensation scheme.
25.05.013(b) would bar same-sex partners from receiving those
same benefits because of the restrictions the statute places on
same-sex couples as a class, at least when the statute is not read
narrowly. However, as the dissent was primarily concerned with
issues of ripeness and standing, it left the substantive issues only
44
partially addressed and not fully conclusive.
III. CARTER V. ALASKA
A. The Setting of the Case
45
Carter followed in 1999, on the heels of Brause. In fact, in the
ripeness arguments raised in Brause, the State identified the eventual plaintiffs in Carter as individuals with potentially proper stand46
ing, in contrast to the plaintiffs in Brause. Unlike the plaintiffs in
Brause, the plaintiffs in Carter could easily specify benefits that
were held back from them and their same-sex domestic partners
but that were extended to married couples.
The plaintiffs in Carter were comprised of the Alaska Civil
Liberties Union and nine same-sex couples, with at least one member of each couple being an employee or retired employee of the
47
state or the Municipality of Anchorage. The plaintiffs’ complaint
was “that because they are prohibited from marrying each other by
Alaska Constitution article I, section 25, they are ineligible for the
employment benefits the defendants provide to married couples,
resulting in a denial of the individual plaintiffs’ right to equal pro42. Brause, 21 P.3d at 363–64 (Bryner, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 364–65 (comparing the benefits claims of same-sex couples and the
possible required benefits for unmarried opposite-sex couples in Burgess Construction Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972)).
44. Brause, 21 P.3d at 365–66. The dissent’s dissatisfaction with the court’s
failure to address the larger substantive issues is evident. Id. at 365 (“But in my
view the court overstates the difficulty of deciding the constitutional question presented. There is certainly ample case law from other jurisdictions to guide this
court’s decision on the merits.”).
45. Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 784
(Alaska 2005).
46. See Brause, 21 P.3d at 360.
47. Carter, 122 P.3d at 784.

04__LOBSINGER.DOC

2006]

6/5/2006 4:00 PM

EX REL. CARTER V. ALASKA

125

tection.”48 The plaintiffs did not challenge the marriage amendment; rather, they challenged the manner by which state and municipal employee benefits were restricted to spouses. Thus, the
plaintiffs argued that the public employee benefits programs violated the equal protection guarantee of article I, section 1 of the
49
Alaska Constitution.
B. The Superior Court
Since there was no factual disagreement, all parties moved for
summary judgment in the superior court. The superior court rejected the plaintiffs’ request to apply heightened scrutiny because:
1) the defendants did not discriminate between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, but rather between married and unmarried
couples, which does not involve a suspect class; and 2) the only
right at issue involved employee benefits, which is not a fundamental right. Consequently, the superior court applied the lowest level
of scrutiny and deferred to the defendants’ stated interests of cost
reduction, administrative efficiency, and the promotion of mar50
riage. The plaintiffs then appealed to the supreme court.
C. The Supreme Court
1. Issue and Holding. The supreme court took up the case
and resolved to answer the substantive issue: Is the spousal limitation for the benefits program of public employees a violation of the
state constitution’s guarantee of “equal rights, opportunities, and
51
protection under the law” for same-sex couples? The court held
that the spousal limitation did indeed violate the constitution’s
52
equal protection clause. As such, the court ordered the parties to
53
file supplemental memoranda to address the matter of remedy.
2. Difference in Treatment. To reach its holding, the court
first examined whether the spousal limitation treated the plaintiffs
differently from other similarly situated persons. The superior
court held that the State’s employee benefits program differentiated between married and unmarried couples, but that all unmarried couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, were treated

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
For the court’s presentation of the plaintiffs’ complaint, see id. at 784–85.
Id.
Id. at 783 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1).
Id. at 783–84.
Id.
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equally. This position is consistent with previous opinions by other
courts that have addressed the issue.54 In reversing this position,
however, the supreme court held that the more appropriate comparison is between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, re55
gardless of their marital status. This, the court found, was the
most appropriate point of comparison for legal analysis because
opposite-sex couples have the opportunity to enter into marriage,
56
and thus become eligible for the spousal employment benefits.
Same-sex couples, on the other hand, are absolutely barred from
57
marrying because of the marriage amendment.
The court cited one case, Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences
58
University, in framing spousal limitations for public employees as
59
discriminatory treatment against same-sex couples. The choice in
citing Tanner is curious because Tanner reasoned that denying employee benefits to unmarried domestic partners had a “disparate
impact” on same-sex couples even though the program in question
60
was facially neutral. Disparate impact claims “involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than an61
other and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Because it
determined that the spousal limitation for the employee benefits
program was facially neutral, the court in Tanner concluded that
discriminatory treatment could only lie in disparate impact. In
Carter, the court referred to the Tanner decision and its conclusion
62
regarding disparate impact, but the court determined that the de63
fendants’ benefits programs were facially discriminatory.
Indeed, the court relied on the programs’ facial discrimination
in order to rebut the defendants’ claim that the spousal limitations

54. Id. at 787 (citing Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); Hinman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994); and Phillips v. Wisconsin Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992) as cases in which same-sex couples were included in the category of unmarried couples merely for purposes of determining discrimination).
55. Id. at 788.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 971 P.2d 435, 442–43 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
59. Carter, 122 P.3d at 788.
60. 971 P.2d. at 443.
61. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (citing Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
62. See Carter, 122 P.3d at 788 n.31.
63. Id. at 788–89.

04__LOBSINGER.DOC

2006]

6/5/2006 4:00 PM

EX REL. CARTER V. ALASKA

127

lacked discriminatory intent.64 Citing federal precedent and theory
of constitutional law, the court concluded that “when a law is discriminatory on its face, ‘the question of discriminatory intent is
subsumed by the determination that the classification established
by the terms of the challenged law or policy is, itself, discrimina65
tory.’”
Framing spousal limitations for employee benefits as facially
discriminatory is a significant departure from the analysis in Tanner
and may indicate a new direction by which courts evaluate provisions that disadvantage same-sex couples. The court appeared to
be aware of this departure when it contrasted its stance with previous cases that found a lack of differential treatment between samesex couples and unmarried opposite-sex couples in employee bene66
fits cases. Although the court never explicitly referred to samesex couples as a class, the court willingly accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that the proper method of measuring equal treatment is
not simply between married and non-married couples, but between
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples. By rejecting the measurement of equal treatment through classification systems that are
merely incidental to same-sex couples, the court appears to have
echoed sentiments expressed by a Vermont court in Baker v.
67
State. In Baker, the court found gender discrimination to be an
inadequate method of measuring the treatment of same-sex couples. It ultimately compared same-sex couples to opposite-sex
couples in holding that Vermont must provide equal rights to
68
same-sex couples and opposite-sex married couples. Similarly, a
recent Massachusetts decision in Goodridge v. Department of Pub64. Id.
65. Id. at 788 (citing Hamlyn v. Rock Island County Metro. Mass Transit Dist.,
986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1997)). The court also cited JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2004) and Cook v. Babbitt,
819 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993). Id.
66. Id. at 787 (citing Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); Hinman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994); and Phillips v. Wisconsin Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992) as cases in which same-sex couples were included in the category of unmarried couples merely for purposes of determining discrimination).
67. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
68. The Vermont Supreme Court held that statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples were facially neutral and did not constitute gender discrimination.
Id. at 880. The court then compared the rights and privileges enjoyed by married
couples with the lack of legal recognition and protection for similarly situated
same-sex couples. Id. at 883–84. The court then ordered the legislature to make
provisions for its decision. Id. at 887.
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lic Health69 directly compared the lack of legal protection and recognition of same-sex couples with that of opposite-sex married couples, rather than attempting to fit the analysis through gender dis70
crimination or any other means of measuring equal treatment.
Thus, the court in Carter appears to have affirmed a trend in
the relatively new line of cases involving the rights of same-sex
couples. Moreover, in explicitly treating spousal limitations on
employee benefits as facially discriminatory against same-sex couples, the court may have taken the judiciary’s awareness of the legal needs of same-sex couples to new heights. The court’s analysis
is remarkable considering that Alaska has a constitutional provi71
sion that clearly limits marriage to one man and one woman. It
remains a curiosity, however, that the court flirted with the concept
72
of disparate impact before ultimately concluding that the employee benefits program was facially discriminatory “disparate
73
treatment.” This is particularly strange in light of the fact that
disparate impact theory is an equal protection assessment tool for
otherwise facially neutral regulations, not for facially discrimina74
tory regulations.
3. The Three-Part Sliding Scale. Once the Carter court concluded that the employee benefits program treated similarly situated people differently through facial discrimination, it employed a
three-part sliding scale to determine whether the unequal treat75
ment could withstand constitutional scrutiny. The three-part sliding scale examined: 1) the weight of the constitutional interest at
stake; 2) the government’s purpose in light of the applicable level
of review required; and 3) the relationship between the stated in76
terests and means to obtain them. In addressing the first part, the
court found that employment benefits are “undeniably economic”
69. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
70. See id. at 961 n.21 (declining to consider whether sexual orientation is a
suspect classification). See also Gerstmann, supra note 3, at 61–63 (critiquing the
use of gender discrimination in the pursuit of equality for same-sex couples).
71. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
72. Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 788
n.31 (Alaska 2005) (citing Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 442–
43, 447 (Or. 1998)).
73. Id. at 789.
74. For an elaboration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s distinctions between disparate impact and disparate treatment, see Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S.
44, 52–53 (2003), and Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36
n.15 (1977).
75. Carter, 122 P.3d at 789–90.
76. Id.
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and thus ought to receive minimum scrutiny.77 Because the court
held that the program could not survive even minimum scrutiny, it
78
Consedid not address the heightened scrutiny arguments.
quently, it is unclear how the court would respond to non-economic
same-sex issues. If discriminatory treatment cannot survive minimal scrutiny, though, it is difficult to imagine very many cases in
which discriminatory treatment between same-sex and oppositesex couples could survive heightened scrutiny.
For the second part of the three-part test, the court examined
the defendants’ interest in the spousal limitations. Because the issue was declared an economic matter, the State and Municipality
79
were required only to show legitimate interests. The defendants
claimed to have three legitimate interests: 1) cost control, 2) ad80
ministrative efficiency, and 3) promotion of marriage. These interests were measured using the third part of the three-part sliding
scale, under which the connection between the defendants’ interest
and the means used must be substantially related, not just ration81
ally related. By utilizing a level of scrutiny that is more stringent
than rational basis review, the court applied the higher standards of
82
Alaska’s equal protection clause, which is similar to the rational
review “plus” that has been employed in Supreme Court analysis
for cases involving the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Consti83
tution.
The court dealt with the interest of cost control in a rather
creatively dismissive fashion. In assessing the defendants’ claim
that the legislature intended to “limit employee benefits to a small,
readily ascertainable group of individuals closely connected with
84
the employee” for the purpose of cost control, the court altered
the defendants’ argument by suggesting that the defendants actually intended to save costs by limiting benefits to those in “truly
85
close relationships” with employees. This virtually made the
spousal limitation impossibly related, much less substantially related, to cost control. The court justified reformulating the State’s

77. Id. at 790.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 791 n.48 (citing Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)).
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 6.
83. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996).
84. Carter, 122 P.3d at 790 (quotations omitted).
85. Id. at 791.
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and Municipality’s cost control claim by concluding that cost control was incompatible with the defendants’ interest in promotion of
marriage, since promoting marriage would drive up costs for the
86
defendants under the spousal limitation scheme.
Although the court may be correct in noting that cost control
and promotion of marriage are logically inconsistent interests,
there appears to be little reason why the court had to alter the defendants’ position in order to find that cost control fails under the
third part of the three-part sliding scale. Surely by providing benefits to same-sex domestic partners of employees, the State and Municipality would not be spending significantly more in benefits than
by limiting the benefits to spouses of employees. Also, since the
court identified the substantial connection required under Alaska’s
equal protection clause, which exceeds that required under simple
87
rational review, the court could have concluded that the expected
insignificant increase in spending would not be substantial enough
to justify discriminatory treatment. In fact, the court acknowledged that even under its altered argument of cost control, the exclusion of same-sex domestic partners of employees does technically reduce costs for the State and Municipality, but nonetheless
88
fails to be substantially related. Undoubtedly, the court could
have reached the same conclusion without altering the defendants’
argument. Moreover, the court comes across as unfairly lacking a
sense of balance by rejecting alternative arguments. The court recognized logically inconsistent, but alternative arguments presented
89
by the plaintiffs, so it is unclear why it felt the need to alter the
logically inconsistent arguments made by the defendants and consequently reduce the defendants’ cost control argument to a far too
vulnerable straw-man.
The second interest the defendants claimed was administrative
efficiency—the desirability of a bright-line distinction between
90
those eligible for benefits and those ineligible. Although it agreed
with the State and Municipality that the lack of formal recognition
of same-sex couples creates difficulties in administrating benefits to
domestic same-sex partners of employees, the court nonetheless
held that the means be substantially related to the interests, and
concluded that the State and Municipality could devise a system to
91
administer the benefits. The court cited other jurisdictions that
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 791–92.
Id. at 791.
See id. at 789–90.
Id. at 791.
Id. 791–93.
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have successfully devised administrative procedures for distributing
benefits to unmarried domestic same-sex partners in order to
pragmatically illustrate that governmental agencies can indeed
treat same-sex partners equal to opposite sex partners and that the
92
lack of a bright-line distinction is not insurmountable.
The court’s use of examples in which employee benefits have
been extended to employees’ domestic same-sex partners has a certain appeal in negating the defendants’ claim that the spousal limitations are substantially related to administrative efficiency. At the
end of its discussion of administrative efficiency, however, the
court added that “administrative difficulties are not an insurmountable barrier to providing benefits if our constitution requires
93
that they be provided.” It is unclear what the court meant to say
by qualifying its assessment of administrative difficulties with constitutional requirements, particularly since such constitutional requirements—in terms of the administrative efficiency interest—are
determined by whether the administrative difficulties are an insurmountable barrier. The court’s reasoning seems circular in that it
essentially holds that the lack of a bright-line distinction is not truly
an administrative difficulty—and thus not a constitutionally valid
reason to deny benefits to same-sex partners—if the constitution
requires providing benefits to same-sex partners. It is not altogether clear why the court added this circular argument when it
made a rather empirically persuasive case that administrative efficiency did not necessitate spousal limitations.
The third interest offered by the defendants for retaining the
94
spousal limitations was the promotion of marriage. The court
agreed with the State and Municipality that “the promotion of mar95
riage is at least a legitimate governmental interest.” What the
court did not agree with, however, was the claim made by the defendants that a connection exists between limiting benefits to
96
spouses and the promotion of marriage. In ruling on what was arguably the defendants’ least persuasive interest, the court held that
“making benefits available to spouses may well promote marriage;
denying benefits to the same-sex domestic partners who are abso92. The court cited the benefits programs at the University of Alaska, in states
including California and Washington, and in a number of cities. Id.
93. Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 793. In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice O’Connor not only found that
marriage is a legitimate state interest, but also, interestingly, that “preserving the
traditional institution of marriage” is a “legitimate state interest.” 539 U.S. 558,
585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
96. Carter, 122 P.3d at 793.
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lutely ineligible to become spouses has no demonstrated relationship to the interest of promoting marriage.”97
4. Other Matters and Dicta. Besides the issues raised under
the three-part sliding scale, the court also addressed a number of
other matters that were not directly related to the facts of Carter
but may provide guidance as to how the court views same-sex issues in general. One of these matters is the signal the court gave
on how it may treat any future state constitutional amendments
that attempt to go beyond limiting marriage to one man and one
98
woman. On the one hand, the court tried to harmonize Alaska’s
marriage amendment and equal protection clauses by narrowly interpreting the marriage amendment as pertaining to marriage and
99
nothing else. Nonetheless, the court hinted that a constitutional
amendment that attempts to exclude same-sex domestic partners
from employee benefits would likely be found unconstitutional un100
der the U.S. Constitution in light of Romer v. Evans. Thus, under
the guidance of Romer, the court interpreted the marriage amend101
This suggests that the court may be willing, at
ment narrowly.
some point, to expand the equal protection clause of the Alaska
Constitution to require some form of legal recognition and protection for same-sex relationships short of actual marriage, such as
102
those that exist in Vermont. A civil union provision that guaran-

97. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court similarly rejected the claim that reducing discriminatory practices against homosexuals would undermine opposite-sex
marriage by turning heterosexuals away from opposite-sex marriages. Evans v.
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996).
98. Carter, 122 P.3d at 786 n.20.
99. Id. at 786 (noting that the marriage amendment does not generally exempt
same-sex couples from the equal protection clause of Alaska’s constitution).
100. Id. at 786 n.20 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
101. Id. at 787.
102. The text of Alaska’s marriage amendment is relatively limited in scope
compared to the text of similar amendments of other states. Compare ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist
only between one man and one woman.”) with UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (“Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given
the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.”) and TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32
(“Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman.
This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any
legal status identical or similar to marriage.”). Nebraska’s broadly worded marriage amendment (“Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or
recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil un-
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tees equal legal protection and recognition of same-sex couples
would not conceptually run afoul of Alaska’s marriage amendment,
especially in light of the constitutional analysis provided in Carter.
In spite of the broad potential Carter may have in expanding
equal rights to same-sex couples, the court stated that its decision
should not be interpreted so as to require the extension of the same
103
rights to polygamous or consanguineous relationships. The court
distinguished same-sex relationships from incestuous relationships
by noting that incest is prohibited by state statute while homosexual conduct is legal and cannot be criminalized post-Lawrence v.
104
Texas. Presumably, the court distinguished polygamy from same105
sex relationships on the same grounds, even though the court
never directly explained its different treatment of polygamy from
same-sex relationships. Cautioning against interpreting its holding
to require the extension of equal protection to consanguineous and
polygamous relationships, the court echoed the same reservations
106
expressed in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. This desire to distinguish incestuous and polygamous relationships is no
doubt moved in part by influential members of the legal community who fear that recognizing equal protection for same-sex relationships will necessarily, in principle, lead to the recognition of
107
Alequal protection for other non-traditional relationships.

ion, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid
or recognized in Nebraska,” NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29) was recently struck down by
a federal district court for violating the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment,
Equal Protection Clause, and Bill of Attainder Clause. Citizens for Equal Prot.,
Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997, 1005, 1008 (D. Neb. 2005). Perhaps this
signals stricter judicial scrutiny over state marriage amendments that go beyond
limiting marriage to one man and one woman.
103. Carter, 177 P.3d at 793 (“Nothing we hold here would require public employers to extend to members of polygamous or incestuous relationships the employment benefits they provide to their employees’ spouses.”).
104. Id. at 788 n.30 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.450 (2004)); see also Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105. Polygamy is a Class A misdemeanor (Unlawful Marrying). ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.51.140 (2004).
106. 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 n.34 (Mass. 2003).
107. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning that the striking of a Texas sodomy statute would mean that no other restrictions on sexual activity could survive rational basis review); George W. Dent, Jr.,
Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 440 (2004)
(presenting the traditional argument that same-sex relationships ought not to be
given legal protection because polygamy and incest will then have to be legally
accepted as well); Samford Levinson, Thinking About Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1049, 1054 (2005) (suggesting grave philosophical difficulties in distinguish-
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though this Comment will not attempt to address the wider issues
of non-traditional relationships beyond same-sex relationships,108 it
is curious to note that the courts in both Carter and Goodridge felt
109
the need to bring up polygamy and incest, even though the facts
or analysis had nothing to do with polygamy or incest. It could be
that the decisions in Carter and Goodridge were fundamentally
grounded in conservative views on marriage and familial relationships, in spite of the recognition of same-sex couples; or perhaps
the courts were keen not to frighten the general public by inviting
all various forms of challenges to marriage-related statutes simultaneously.
A final matter to which the court drew attention, but that was
not part of the central holding of the case, was the different levels
of legal expectations the court placed on same-sex couples and
110
In referring to a case where a
unmarried opposite-sex couples.
loss of consortium claim was brought by an unmarried opposite-sex
cohabitant, the court emphasized that the denial of the consortium
claim was reasonable because the opposite-sex cohabitants had the
opportunity to marry and thus to be eligible for loss of consortium
111
However, same-sex couples cannot legally marry. For
claims.
this reason, the rationale supporting the one case example where a
loss of consortium claim was denied to an individual in an unmarried opposite-sex couple could not be used to deny same-sex cou112
ples financial claims that are owed to them.
5. Remedy. The court invited the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the issue of remedies and permitted the dis113
puted program to remain in effect until resolution of the issue. In
this matter, the court suggested that the State and Municipality
look to other state and local governments, as well as private eming claims for equal rights for polygamists from claims for equal rights for samesex couples); Brett H. McDonnell, Responses to Lawrence v. Texas: Is Incest
Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337, 359 (2004) (criticizing, in sympathy with
rights for same-sex couples, the lack of support given to efforts to decriminalize
consensual adult incest).
108. For a fairly analytical, but ultimately inconclusive, examination of the legal
issues surrounding polygamy and incest, see Gerstmann, supra note 3, at 99–111.
109. For references in the Carter case, see supra notes 103–04. See also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 n.34 (Mass. 2003).
110. Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 112 P.3d 781, 794
(Alaska 2005).
111. Id. (referring to Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916
(Alaska 2000)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 795.
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ployers who offer benefits to domestic same-sex partners of employees, as useful models for implementing a sufficient benefits
114
program. The court also cited Goodridge as an example in which
the legislature was given time to take appropriate action to meet
115
the holding of the court.
IV. REFLECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS
The incredible irony of Carter is that the marriage amendment
possibly ensured that the court would examine the difference in
treatment between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, rather than
between married and unmarried ones. Without the marriage
amendment, there would not have been an absolute need for the
court to treat same-sex couples as their own class. This is so because, as unmarried couples, same-sex couples may still have theoretically possessed the opportunity to marry, and thereby, to avail
themselves of spousal benefits. Even with the existence of the De116
fense of Marriage Act, the court could still have refused to assess
disparate treatment between same-sex couples and opposite-sex
couples by deciding to address the merit of the issue only at the
point of a constitutional challenge against the Defense of Marriage
Act.
With marriage absolutely barred against same-sex couples as a
consequence of the marriage amendment, however, the ineligibility
of a domestic same-sex partner of an employee to become a
“spouse” under the employee benefits program became a critical
issue under equal protection clause analysis. In this sense, the marriage amendment, together with the equal protection clause and
the benefits program’s spousal limitation, virtually forced the court
117
to hear the case by categorizing the plaintiffs as same-sex couples.
Because of the way the marriage amendment actually assisted
the plaintiffs in Carter by assuring them status as same-sex couples,
rather than merely unmarried couples, Carter may offer a way forward for other states with marriage amendments to reconcile de-

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Act of May 7, 1996, ch. 21, 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 (codified at ALASKA
STAT. §§ 25.05.011(a), .013(a), .013(b) (2004)).
117. But see Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244–45 (predicting that the Amendment would trump all claims brought by same-sex couple plaintiffs and that samesex couples would not be able to attain benefits reserved for married couples because courts would follow the distinction of married couple and unmarried couple
and, consequently, find no suspect classification).
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mocratically chosen marriage amendments118 with a real need for
legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples. Although
the decision in Carter most likely fails to satisfy completely those
who are most adamant about denying legal recognition to same-sex
relationships and those who insist on nothing less than full marriage equality for same-sex couples, for the time being at least,
Carter provides a middle ground that permits states with marriage
amendments to retain their amendments while simultaneously securing important rights for same-sex couples, especially since the
rationale in Carter is open for extension to all rights and privileges
short of actual marriage.
Applying the rationale of Carter in individual state legal environments naturally would produce varying results, with some states
being more protective of same-sex couples than others. Besides
different constitutional equal protection doctrines, states have
119
widely varying statutes and regulations affecting homosexuals.
Despite the diverse legal patchwork that exists throughout the
United States, Carter is a useful model for other states largely because it represents the first decision by a state supreme court to extend equal employment benefits to same-sex domestic partners of
public employees in a state with a marriage amendment. Additionally, taking into consideration that Alaska was the first state in
the republic to ratify a marriage amendment and that a high per118. The weight that should be given to state constitutional amendments in
terms of assessing democratic mechanics in conflict with important, recognized
individual rights has been given much discussion in the context of marriage
amendments. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Restoring Democratic SelfGovernance Through the Federal Marriage Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95
(2004); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State
Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (1999).
119. States that have an executive order or governor’s policy prohibiting discrimination against public employees based on sexual orientation and gender
identity are Kentucky (2003), Indiana (2004), and Pennsylvania (2003). States
that have an executive order, administrative order, or personnel regulation prohibiting discrimination against public employees based on sexual orientation are
Alaska (2002), Arizona (2003), Colorado (2002), Delaware (2001), Louisiana
(2004), Michigan (2003), Montana (2000), and Virginia (2006). States that have a
law or policy that provides state employees with domestic partner benefits are
California (1999), Connecticut (2000), Illinois (2004), Iowa (2003), New Jersey
(2004), New Mexico (2003), New York (1995), Oregon (1995), Rhode Island
(2001), Vermont (1994), and Washington (2001), as well as the District of Columbia (2001). See Human Rights Campaign, “Laws and Policies Affecting State
Employees,” http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_Community&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16306 (last visited
Mar. 29, 2006).
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centage of Alaskans approved of it,120 the court in Carter moved
Alaska significantly along in recognizing and protecting limited yet
significant rights for same-sex couples.
An illustration of how Carter might provide guidance to other
state courts in dealing with the struggle between a marriage
amendment and equal protection of same-sex couples is the current
debate in Oregon. In 2004, Oregon added a marriage amendment
121
The quick ratification of the amendment
to its constitution.
mooted litigation challenging state statutes that made no provision
122
for same-sex marriages. In holding the litigation to be moot, the
Oregon court did not address the issue of marriage benefits because the plaintiffs did not properly bring the issue before the
123
Following the lead of the plaintiffs in Carter, same-sex
court.
couples may have reasonable opportunity to bring a case for mar124
riage benefits in light of Oregon’s relatively broad equal protec125
tion clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The Alaska Supreme Court in Carter handed over a remarkable decision in terms of its context, timing, and circumstances. Although the decision was not without some questionable lines of
reasoning, the holding was able to carefully navigate between respect for the state’s marriage amendment and recognition that
same-sex couples are entitled to equal protection. At a time when
many states have, in the last couple of years, adopted marriage
amendments, it is now more critical than ever for courts to be able
to reconcile majoritarian democracy with equal protection for all
individuals. Significantly, Carter recognized the identity of samesex couples as such, rather than attempting to fit same-sex couples
into an incidental characteristic or category. This permitted the
court to address the issues affecting same-sex relationships far
more squarely, honestly, and respectfully than has been the norm.

120. See Clarkson, supra note 19, at 244.
121. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5(a) (“It is the policy of Oregon, and its political
subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid
or legally recognized as a marriage.”).
122. Li v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005).
123. Id.
124. Oregon already provides state employees with domestic partner benefits.
See supra note 119.
125. “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens.” OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
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Perhaps it is those features, more than anything else, which will
help reunite our fractured and polarized society.

